The analysis of the propensity to search under price dispersion discovers the identity of the optimal consumption-leisure choices in the model of optimal search and in the classical model of individual labor supply when the propensity to search is unimportant. However, the vigorous propensity to search, which occurs when consumers visit high-price stores, challenges the classical view on the optimal labor-leisure trade-off. The vigorous propensity to search creates the positive consumption-leisure relationship. The willingness to substitute labor by search under price dispersion also changes the understanding of the income elasticity of demand. The modest propensity to search creates normal but income inelastic demand. The income elastic demand becomes the result of the vigorous propensity to search where consumption-leisure trade-off is positive and either consumption or leisure becomes “bad”. This theoretical assumption proves the occurrence of Veblen effect as well as money...
Category - Sergey MALAKHOV
Pierre-Mendes-France University, France
The theory of the optimal-consumption leisure choice under price dispersion describes the phenomenon of moral hazard as the customer’s reaction on unfair insurance policy. The unfair insurance offer does not equalize marginal costs of propensity to seek healthcare with marginal benefits on purchase. Under unfair insurance policy consumers increase ex post healthcare seeking activities and they optimize their consumption of medical services. The analysis of moral hazard results in the assumption that the increase in the time horizon of the unfair insurance offer makes it fair and moral hazard becomes inefficient. The time horizon competition between insurance companies can eliminate moral hazard effect that clears the way to the competitive equilibrium.
If the demand under price dispersion is formed by consumers with zero search costs and consumers with positive search costs, the law of one price holds at the equilibrium price level, where the lowest willingness to pay between consumers with zero search costs meets the willingness to accept or to sell of consumers with positive search costs. Consumers with positive search costs maximize their utility with respect to their optimal decisions when marginal losses in labor income during the search are equal to marginal savings on purchase. Optimal decisions move their willingness to accept to the equilibrium price level. Suboptimal decisions of consumers with positive search costs result in willingness to accept below the lowest willingness to pay of consumers with zero search costs and arbitrage takes place. Arbitrage drops down the equilibrium price to the level where willingness to accept of consumers with positive search costs meets the new lowest willingness to pay of consumers with...
The analysis of the propensity to search specifies the “common” or the ordinary model of consumer behavior based on the synthesis of the neoclassical approach with satisficing concept, and “leisure” and “labor” models of behavior that represent different combinations of conspicuous consumption, leisure, and labor. While the “common model” of behavior demonstrates a moderate propensity to search, “leisure” and “labor” models of consumer behavior exhibit vigorous propensities to search that results in purchase of unnecessary items and therefore in overconsumption. This trend is also presented in home production where vigorous propensity to search takes the form of the vigorous propensity to produce at home. The analysis of trends in allocation of time provides grounds for the assumption that men have more accentuated propensity to search and to produce at home than women that results in overconsumption of unnecessary items.
Willingness to Overpay for Insurance and for Consumer Credit: Search and Risk Behavior Under Price Dispersion
When income growth under price dispersion reduces the time of search and raises prices of purchases, the increase in purchase price can be presented as the increase in the willingness to pay for insurance or the willingness to pay for consumer credit. The optimal consumer decision represents the trade-off between the propensity to search for beneficial insurance or consumer credit, and marginal savings on insurance policy or consumer credit. Under price dispersion the indirect utility function takes the form of cubic parabola, where the risk aversion behavior ends at the saddle point of the comprehensive insurance or the complete consumer credit. The comparative static analysis of the saddle point of the utility function discovers the ambiguity of the departure from risk-neutrality. This ambiguity can produce the ordinary risk seeking behavior as well as mathematical catastrophes of Veblen-effect’s imprudence and over prudence of family altruism. The comeback to risk aversion is also...
Slutsky Equation and Negative Elasticity of Labor Supply: Behavioral Bias or Optimal Consumption-Leisure Choice?
One of the applications of the prospect theory is the behavioral phenomenon of the negative elasticity of the individual labor supply. This paper argues that the negative elasticity of labor supply can be understood better with the help of the interpretation of the Slutsky equation with regard to the common consumption-leisure choice. The interpretation of the Slutsky equation corresponds to the empirical evidence that leisure is a net complement for an important part of consumption.